Afghanistan at the Centre of the new Great Game: Implications for Pakistan.

In the late 1990s, some journalists used the expression "The New Great Game" to describe what they proposed was a renewed geopolitical interest in Central Asia based on the mineral wealth of the region. The name is a reference to the original Great Game, the term used by historians to describe the 19th-century political and diplomatic competition between the British and Russian empires for territory and influence among Central Asian states.

In 1996, The New York Times published an opinion piece titled "The New Great Game in Asia" in which was written:

While few have noticed, Central Asia has again emerged as a murky battleground among big powers engaged in an old and rough geopolitical game. Western experts believe that the largely untapped oil and natural gas riches of the Caspian Sea countries could make that region the Persian Gulf of the next century. The object of the revived game is to befriend leaders of the former Soviet republics controlling the oil, while neutralizing Russian suspicions and devising secure alternative pipeline routes to world markets.

In four books from 1997 to 2008 Zbigniew Brzezinski outlined a comprehensive American foreign posture around the geopolitical grail of Central Asia. Since 1945 the United States has been largely defined as the first non-Eurasian thalassocracy to prevail in the Great Game, yet for how long? Maybe the superpower in the position to rule the wave while avoiding the making of formal dominions in its most vital areas of interest still felt at a disadvantage against the Eurasian Great Gamers. This stance was underlined by that the Cold War shaped most of the US strategic thinking. Once under pressure it will have chosen force to impose its will. The problem is that at least since the 16th century no empire has sustainably prevailed by force in Afghanistan. Besides, neocon strategists never provided a convincing answer to the question "why would you succeed where the Russians failed?" The way the Great Game will evolve after 2011 shall lay the foundations of the whole 21st century geopolitics. In this article we provide a historical analysis of the Great Game emphasizing the contribution of the most local human factor to global geopolitical changes. We also try to anticipate a few trends underlining the growing power of projecting popular hope, prosperity and dignity in advancing political interests. Man is thus free to demonstrate the realist political profitability of peace and the millennium development goals in this new round of the Great Game, which shall open with a grand new deal to which each thinker may contribute. In particular, we anticipate it be defined by noopolitik and the knowledge economy, beyond geography, the most promising means for any Great Gamer to decisively prevail over the many others.

A defeat on the Eurasian Heartland can be most painful. Since Alexander the Great no empire has long survived an injury in Central Asia. This fairly verifiable phenomenon has become an empiric rule of military history:

The US has broken the second rule of war. That is, don't go fighting with your land army on the mainland of Asia. Rule One is don't march on Moscow. From McKinder & Brzezinski's theoretical guidelines we may sum-up the US position as that of the first non Eurasian power prevailing in the Great Game. If we consider Britain a Eurasian power such situation is unprecedented. Of this New World Order reported by whom Brzezinski (2007) calls "Global Leader I" the administration of "Global Leader III" reaped a sense of invulnerability which misled it to believe the Greater Middle East could be reshaped by force. Such plan included the control of Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and ultimately Iran and the subsequent creating of a Baluchi client state between Pakistan and Iran. Although its strategic stakes remain mostly vital to the US foreign posture the total obsolescence of its method in less than ten years Brzezinski has called "the cemetery of neocon dreams".

The control of Afghanistan was a priority before China, which sphere of influence clearly covers the area and which made its intentions clear in embracing globalization, or Russia still on its knees after the ruble crisis, (re-)establish themselves as significant Great Gamers. The second objective was necessarily Iraq with its vast oil reserves and its border with Iran, the ultimate goal now unattainable by force (though not necessarily by soft powers, including the partaking in a legitimate popular revolution). Projecting the forces and personnel of a country endowed with one of the highest standards of living in countries both desperate and long seasoned (Iraq by the carnage of the 1980-1988 war and Afghanistan by that of 1979-1989 and subsequent civil war) could only lead to a protracted occupation devoid of decisive victories and especially insensitive to shock or terror, which military strategists have often considered a last resort "antibiotic" to insurgency. Brzezinski recalls how Churchill himself urged the Royal Air Force to resort to chemical weapons in the Iraq of the 1920s. Thus resistance can never be deemed futile if it is no option. Such ultima ratio populorum may always bend the ultima ratio regum on the long term. In that we may have another well-sourced rule of war.

By contrast the resort to the skillful projection of hope and prosperity in a "Shock and Awe" doctrine of projecting economic power may become increasingly more palatable to strategists as a pragmatic continuation of political intercourses by other means. The credible implementation of this option is yet made harder for the USA which international standing has been deeply tarnished by the "global war on Terror". Even the unparalleled versatility of the American soft power, epitomized by Barack Obama's 2009 address at Al Azhar University, has hardly restored a credible American leadership in the Middle East that is fit to the most subtle stakes of the 21st century.

To govern is to foresee, and in a nuclear world empires have become too big to fail. If they collapse, decline or fold the vacuum left in their influence may not be filled at once portending many conflicts in their periphery. The dismantling of the USSR has left the world with manifold vivid memories of such atrocious "low intensity" conflicts from Algeria to the Balkans to the Caucasus to Central Asia and the New World Order has been marked by a steep rise in the number of conflicts from 1991 to 2011. Brzezinski often underlines that while in the past it was easier to govern rather than to kill a million the reverse is still most verified at the beginning of the 21st century's second decade.

Without precipitating an all-out war (but the rules of engagement in the global economic war are proving much different, especially since 1991) the international situation since Hiroshima is not conducive to all-out peace either. While this so-called sub-optimality of post WWII international relations has never been formally proven inevitable it is easily explained by the dynamism of great powers' spheres of influence. This well-verified dynamics of Pacium Imperiorum (from say the Pandora's box of nationalist passions in either the post Pax Carolum or Pax Napoleonica Europe to the sovereign solidification of post Pax Britannica colonies in the Indies and Africa) must be anticipated in its American manifestation. Like tides superpowers do ebb and advance across countries which, in changing hands, are among the modern world's most flammable zones.

Vladimir Putin thus often called the USSR's dismantling the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Either directly or not, Russia's latest cycle of contraction and expansion also coincided with the claiming of over one million lives (without counting the massacre of the so-called "African World War") including at least 200 000 Chechens, 200 000 Algerians and 270 000 ex-Yugoslavians.The writing on the wall is clear. Afghanistan has been abandoned not only by the world powers that promised never to do it again, but also by the Afghan National Army that has simply disintegrated without even putting up a real fight. In time honoured fashion, leaders in provinces cut their side deals, bought their insurance policies, got bribed or convinced, and opened the gates of the cities and garrisons for the Pakistan-backed Taliban militia to takeover. It is now a matter of days before Kabul falls to the Taliban.

The way things are heading, one of two outcomes is likely: First, the buzz is that the Americans are leaning upon President Ashraf Ghani to resign and leave. An interim government, probably led by the Taliban, will take over and throw some crumbs at people associated with the ancient regime to keep the fiction of power sharing alive. Perhaps there will be some agreement on giving safe passage to some of the current incumbents and to ensure that there is no large-scale massacre of either soldiers or civilians. Because the Taliban would not have captured Kabul by force but through a 'negotiated settlement', it will open doors for international recognition. The Chinese will probably be the first to recognise the Taliban regime, followed by the Pakistanis. The Russians, Central Asians, and perhaps Iran will follow suit. No eyebrows will be raised if the Western countries also come back to Kabul. But even if they don't, no one will be too bothered about it. The West will turn its back on Afghanistan, occasionally tut-tutting about the human rights situation, treatment of women and religious minorities, and curbs on personal freedoms. But otherwise, Afghanistan will be forgotten like a bad dream.

The second outcome is that some people in Kabul decide to make a final stand and not go down without a fight. They would, of course, be fighting a losing war and only prolonging the inevitable because there will be no worthwhile assistance coming their way. In the end, within a few days, or at best, a week or two, Kabul will fall. But the resistance will result in destruction in the city and of course a massacre. The West might have abandoned Afghanistan but cannot afford the optics of widespread death and destruction, a televised man-made calamity for which it is responsible. The political fallout of such an event will be disastrous and will define the remainder of Biden's term as well as the legacy of his presidency. Therefore, the US administration would be very keen to prevent this outcome. That is probably why it is leaning on Ghani to go for the first option. Ghani seems to be conflicted. Reports are that there is pressure on him to hold firm. But the statement he has released suggest that there will be some negotiations to give a modicum of face saving and then Ghani will quit, not just the office but also Afghanistan.

The bottom-line is that the world is reconciling itself to a Talibanised Afghanistan. The charade of Doha dialogue has run its course. Its sole purpose of giving some international visibility and legitimacy to the Taliban has been served. At the same time, it was useful in lulling the Americans and the Afghans and stringing them along in a completely fruitless dialogue. With the final denouement days away, the US pressure on Ghani to quit on August 14 was probably America's independence day gift to Pakistan which suffused with triumphalism cannot stop gloating. Of course, the Pakistanis are also speaking with a forked tongue. Domestically, they are celebrating the Taliban victory. But externally, they are pretending to be extremely worried about the Talibanisation of Afghanistan. The more people predict that the fallout of a Talibanised Afghanistan will be serious for Pakistan, the better it is for Pakistan because it helps them deflect all the anger and accusations of having backed the Taliban for the last two decades and absolves them of any blame that comes their way.

The Pakistani factor

The reality however is that both the Pakistanis and the Taliban were pushing hard to end the war as soon as possible by capturing the entire country. A prolonged conflict suited neither of them because it would put paid to all the grand plans and schemes they had, including extending CPEC to Central Asia and bringing to fruition the connectivity and geo-economic dreams of Pakistan. That is why Pakistan doubled down on the Taliban offensive. While maintaining plausible deniability, the generals have put all their weight behind the military solution that the Taliban had always wanted to impose. The way the generals in Rawalpindi see it, the doomsday scenarios being painted by some analysts of the Taliban stratagem backfiring are far-fetched. There could be some trouble, but nothing the Pakistan Army cannot handle. The generals are also not overly concerned over any kind of international isolation or even sanctions being imposed on Pakistan. At worst, there could be some tension in relations with the West. Pakistanis calculate that they will be able to ride these out partly with the support of other countries—China, Russia, etc. But also because the Pakistanis believe the US cannot push things over the edge as it will continue to need Pakistani airspace for its 'over-the-horizon', and will want to have eyes and ears on ground in Pakistan to monitor what's happening in Afghanistan.

The more people predict that the fallout of a Talibanised Afghanistan will be serious for Pakistan, the better it is for Pakistan because it helps them deflect all the anger and accusations of having backed the Taliban for the last two decades and absolves them of any blame that comes their way.

In the Pakistani calculus, a quick capture of Kabul and Afghanistan would confront the world with a fait accompli. Even if some countries led by the US shunned the Taliban, there were others that would eagerly and gladly accept the new reality and establish relations with the Taliban regime. The Chinese are already reported to be all primed up to accord recognition to the Taliban. Once they take the lead, the Pakistanis will follow. The Russians, Central Asian states and Iran would also do the same. This will be seen in Pakistan as another grand diplomatic and strategic achievement – the PRICs alliance comprising Pakistan, Russia, Iran, China and Central Asian states built around Afghanistan, an alliance that would obviate the need to seek Western recognition. And if things work out according to plan, even some of the Western countries might fall in line. Already there are some indications that the US is holding out the carrot of recognition, or at least acceptance of Taliban capturing Kabul, provided they allow the evacuation of people and diplomats to take place unhindered.

With the deed of allowing the Taliban to capture Afghanistan having been all but done, all eyes will be on what happens next in Afghanistan and its repercussions on the region and beyond. All the grand plans of Pakistan and some other countries will hinge on how the Taliban behave and run Afghanistan. If the Taliban remain unreconstructed and indulge in the atrocities for which they are infamous, then unless one is being overly presumptuous, they will remain a pariah regime, at least for the West. Equally critical will be their relationship with other international jihadist terror groups. The apprehension is that Afghanistan will once again become terror central—a safe haven for all sorts of Islamist terror groups from all over the region and rest of the world. In a recent interview, the Taliban spokesman took a very ambiguous stand on Taliban relationship with these groups. The fact that over the last 20 years, the Taliban and these jihadist groups have fought together and become brothers-in-arms means that they share bonds that will not be broken just because the Taliban have captured power in Kabul. But going forward, will the Taliban restrain these groups from pursuing their own agendas? The answer to that question will determine the relationship of a Talibanised Afghanistan with rest of the world, and especially with regional players.

If the Taliban prove they are not medieval monsters but only deeply conservative, India could open up to them. Or they will make an outreach to India to balance Pakistan.

For now, the Taliban aren't really going to clampdown on these groups which have been part of their war effort. They will e required as Taliban consolidates its control and mops up any pocket of resistance. But once this phase is over, Taliban will have to take a call on these groups, many of which will want that the Taliban now support their agenda just like they supported the Taliban agenda. If Taliban restrict these groups, there 

could be a falling out and conflict; if they give them space to do what they want to do, it will create problems with neighbours. The thing is that even the neighbours who are ready to deal with the Taliban are apprehensive about them. They will, therefore, want to keep some leverages over the Taliban. This could mean giving refuge to some anti-Taliban forces. For their part, the Taliban too will want to keep the Tajik, Uzbek, Pakistani, Chinese, Chechen, Arab, and some Iranian terrorists on their side as a counter leverage in case some of these countries start getting any ideas about interfering in Afghanistan. The internal dynamics within the Taliban will also be a determining factor on how these foreign jihadists are treated. The political side of Taliban have been giving all types of assurances, but it is the military commanders on ground who have been working with many of these foreign jihadists. Who will call the shots remains to be seen.

Finally, there is the Pakistani factor. The Pakistanis have supported the Taliban, given them sanctuary and bases, helped rebuild their military power, given them access to weapons and money, even directed and planned their operations and strategy, and done things (including assassinations) to keep the Taliban movement from splitting. Understandably, the Pakistanis feel they have a major claim to what happens in Afghanistan. But as some analysts have pointed out, many Taliban harbour deep resentment over how they have been treated and bullied by the Pakistanis. For their part, the Pakistanis are wary of Taliban recalcitrance, defiance, and support for the Pakistani Taliban. These factors might not come into play surface immediately but will eventually. The thing is that the Pakistanis desperately need to get Afghanistan right this time. They cannot afford isolation, even less in the region. They have enormous stakes riding on Afghanistan, all of which now depend on how Taliban run their affairs. Naturally, the Pakistanis will want to have a say in this, and as is their wont, they will be overbearing, interfering and demanding, something that could lead to a pushback from the Taliban, and perhaps create an opening for India.

Space for India

Let us be clear. There is no end-game in Afghanistan. A new 'Great Game' is just starting. India needs to show strategic patience. It is a matter of time before things open up for India once again. Perhaps if the Taliban prove they are not medieval monsters but only deeply conservative, India could open up to them. Or they will make an outreach to India to balance Pakistan. Alternatively, there could be resistance to Taliban from around the region, which again will open up new options for India. For now, however, India must prepare for the long game. This includes helping India's friends in Afghanistan by giving them refuge. They will be our strongest allies whenever things take a turn in Afghanistan. Helping Afghan friends isn't just an emotional or sentimental response, it is also a strategic response. The Afghans India helped in the really tough times in the 1990s became our strongest allies for the last 20 years. That India lost opportunity after opportunity in Afghanistan over these two decades isn't on the Afghans, but on Indian policymakers who focused more on soft power and not enough on developing hard power options in a hard country like Afghanistan.