Wor on terror and its effects on South Asian Countries

By : Syed Suliman Banoori

Student of Bs Political Science 4th semester

Definition

War on Terror" It refers to the international military campaign that started after the September 11 attacks on the United States. It was originally used with a particular focus on countries associated with Islamic terrorism organizations including al-Qaeda and like-minded organizations.

The person Who Start the war:

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, President George W. Bush announced a comprehensive plan to seek out and stop terrorists around the world.

war on terrorism, term used to describe the American-led global counterterrorism campaign launched in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In its scope, expenditure, and impact on international relations, the war on terrorism was comparable to the Cold War; it was intended to represent a new phase in global political relations and has had important consequenc

The war on terrorism was a multidimensional campaign of almost limitless scope. Its military dimension involved major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, covert operations in Yemen and elsewhere, large-scale military-assistance programs for cooperative regimes, and major increases in military spending. Its intelligence dimension comprised institutional reorganization and considerable increases in the funding of America's intelligence-gathering capabilities, a global program of capturing terrorist suspects and interning them at Guantánamo Bay, expanded cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies, and the tracking and interception of terrorist financing. Its diplomatic dimension included continuing efforts to construct and maintain a global coalition of partner states and organizations and an extensive public diplomacy campaign to counter anti-Americanism in the Middle East. The domestic dimension of the U.S. war on terrorism entailed new antiterrorism legislation, such as the USA PATRIOT Act; new security institutions, such as the Department of Homeland Security; the preventive detainment of thousands of suspects; surveillance and intelligence-gathering programs by the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and local authorities; the strengthening of emergency-response procedures; and increased security measures for airports, borders, and public events.

The successes of the first years of the war on terrorism included the arrest of hundreds of terrorist suspects around the world, the prevention of further large-scale terrorist attacks on the American mainland, the toppling of the Taliban regime and subsequent closure of terrorist-training camps in Afghanistan, the capture or elimination of many of al-Qaeda's senior members, and increased levels of international cooperation in global counterterrorism efforts.

However, critics argued that the failures of America's counterterrorism campaign outweighed its successes. They contended that the war in Afghanistan had effectively scattered the al-Qaeda network, thereby making it even harder to counteract, and that the attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq had increased anti-Americanism among the world's Muslims, thereby amplifying the message of militant Islam and uniting disparate groups in a common cause. Other critics alleged that the war on terrorism was a contrived smokescreen for the pursuit of a larger U.S. geopolitical agenda that included controlling global oil reserves, increasing defense spending, expanding the country's international military presence, and countering the strategic challenge posed by various regional powers.

By the time of U.S. Pres. George W. Bush's reelection in 2004, the drawbacks of the war on terrorism were becoming apparent. In Iraq, U.S. forces had overthrown the government of Saddam Hussein in 2003, and U.S. war planners had underestimated the difficulties of building a functioning government from scratch and neglected to consider how this effort could be complicated by Iraq's sectarian tensions, which had been held in check by Saddam's repressive regime but were unleashed by his removal. By late 2004 it was clear that Iraq was sinking into chaos and civil war; estimates of the number of Iraqi civilians killed during the period of maximum violence—roughly 2004 to 2007—vary widely but generally exceed 200,000. U.S. casualties during this period far outnumbered those suffered during the initial 2003 invasion. Afghanistan, which for several years had seemed to be under control, soon followed a similar trajectory, and by 2006 the U.S. was facing a full-blown insurgency there led by a reconstituted Taliban.

The Bush administration faced domestic and international criticism for actions that it deemed necessary to fight terrorism but which critics considered to be immoral, illegal, or both. These included the detention of accused enemy combatants without trial at Guantánamo Bay and at several secret prisons outside the United States, the use of torture against these detainees in an effort to extract

The Impact of the War Against Terror on Pakistan Moonis Ahmer1 I. Introduction Almost ten years after the U.S. led war on terror primarily against alQaeda and its military attacks and occupation of Afghanistan; it is time to analyze the implications for Pakistan of what American policy makers said in the aftermath of deadly terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC as America's "first war of 21st century". No war has a pleasant impact on any nation or society. While wars with weapons and military engagements cause colossal loss of human lives, the war on terror is a unique term in which the enemy primarily is a non-state actor but has a capability to strike against military and civilian targets. Terrorism is an act which is undoubtedly considered as a major threat to global peace and security but the war on terror lacks clarity, credibility and coordination as the term terrorism still has a definitional problem. A great deal has been written since September 2001, explaining the reasons who pushed former President Pervez Musharraf to join the U.S. led war on terror resulting in the dismantling of the Taliban regime in Kabul and the spill over effects of the U.S and allied military operations in Afghanistan on Pakistani society. The killing of Osama Bin Laden by the U.S. Navy Seals under "Operation Geronimo" on May 2, 2011 in a compound located in the vicinity of Pakistan Military Academy Kakul, Abbotabad and the surge in terrorist activities in Pakistan following his death also raise an important issue about the role of non-state actors in augmenting the terrorist threat in Pakistan. What is needed now is to examine important factors which have shaped Islamabad's policy in dealing with a grave and serious threat in the shape of Islamic militancy, suicide attacks and the surge of anti-Americanism particularly in provinces bordering Afghanistan. Also international and strategic dynamics are to be examined for the emergence of 'ethnic religious nationalism' in parts of Pakistan and the marginalization of secular and moderate elements in the post-September 2001 period. One major criticism in Pakistan against the U.S. led war on terror was the manner in which the former President Pervez Musharraf plunged his country in a difficult situation since September 2001. In this period drone attacks by the U.S from across the border into tribal areas caused widespread domestic resentment. Also, the Musharraf regime handed over hundreds of al-Qaeda suspects to the United States while reined in terrorist hideouts in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Washington asked Islamabad to do more to eliminate what it called the "safe heavens" of al-Qaeda and Taliban inside Pakistani territory. The warning given by the Afghan President Hamid Karzai to Pakistan on June 14, 2008 about the possibility of Afghan forces attacking what he called, "terrorist hideouts" of al-Qaeda in the tribal areas of Pakistan is another example of worsening of conflict between Kabul and Islamabad. In a quick and hard response the Pakistan government rejected the allegations of Kabul and warned the Karzai regime of serious consequences in the event of the violation of Pakistani's sovereignty. This article examines the implications of the U.S. led war on terror on Pakistan by responding to the following questions:1 . What are the implications of war on terror for Pakistan's domestic and foreign policy? 2. Why Pakistan is unable to take a firm stance on drone attacks on its territory and why ISAF-Afghan and Pakistan trilateral mechanism to prevent cross border infiltration and conflicting issues has not been able to produce positive results? 3. Is there a possibility of a qualitative change in Pakistan's role in War on Terror once the U.S. forces quit Afghanistan? The paper also examines different perceptions ranging from elite to civil society on.

South Asia and the Taliban: Ground Zero for a New Cold War? 

Afghanistan has been at the heart of Indo-Pakistani relations for over forty years. Indeed, the Pakistani notion of "strategic depth" crystallized in the 1980s: Islamabad, and Rawalpindi where military headquarters are located, were gaining a foothold in Afghanistan in order to carry more weight against India - even if only geographically. 

This is partly why the Pakistani Army - together with the United States - supported the Mujahideen in defeating the Soviets in the late 1980s and subsequently helped bring the Taliban to power in the mid-1990s. For the Pakistanis, Mullah Omar's troops provided another advantage: although they were Pashtuns, they supported an Islamist identity curbing Pashtun nationalism which Islamabad feared since the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Since the 1920s, Pashtun nationalists had refused to identify with the Pakistani national project, having either pledged allegiance to Mahatma Gandhi's Congress, or because they considered Afghanistan their motherland. Kabul, until the 1980s, had cultivated the idea that the Pashtuns of Pakistan were destined to join Afghanistan, as well as an intense partnership with New Delhi. The Taliban's first victory had thus ended Pakistan's fear of one day witnessing the creation of a unified Pashtunistan, and alleviated the chokehold of the Indo-Afghani friendship.

For India, on the other hand, the rise of the Taliban in 1996 was an immediate disaster, not only because of the geopolitical reasons I have just mentioned, but also because Afghanistan was becoming a hotbed of Islamism, with jihadists likely to strike in Jammu and Kashmir. Indeed, as soon as the anti-Soviet jihad ended, Pakistani terrorists - having gained their credentials in Afghanistan - were quick to strike in India. They struck in Kashmir in the 1990s, and as far as Delhi and Mumbai in the 2000s. Thus India saw the post-9/11 war as an opportunity to regain a foothold in Afghanistan, establishing itself along the tracks of Western advances. While India did not send troops, it did establish a very generous aid policy, making it the fifth largest donor to a country in the midst of reconstruction from the mid-2000s onwards. India built roads, a children's hospital and even the Afghan parliament! Hamid Karzai, who had studied in India after the Soviet invasion, was a key ally in the 2000s. New Delhi then bet on his successor, Ashraf Ghani, to the point of delivering attack helicopters to Afghanistan in December 2015, during an official visit by Narendra Modi to Kabul.

Hence, for India, the return of the Taliban is an undeniable setback.

Hence, for India, the return of the Taliban is an undeniable setback. It is all the more bitter because it reflects and accentuates a certain isolation, both diplomatic and geopolitical. At the diplomatic level, this isolation was highlighted by the fact that India was kept out of the Doha talks (in which the Americans participated) and the Moscow talks (orchestrated by the Russians). 

While the Russians probably did not want to invite India because of its growing ties with the United States, the fact that the Indians were not invited to Doha is more difficult to explain. Did the other participants in the negotiations - including the Americans - give in to Pakistani pressure? Did they punish India for its pusillanimity? After all, the United States had asked India to become more involved in Afghanistan - including militarily.

Geopolitically, India has been weakened in more ways than one by this entanglement with three regional powers. China, which shares a border with Afghanistan, has said it is willing to hold talks with the Taliban. The latter could let the Middle Kingdom exploit its vast natural resources - including a copper mine that the Chinese already own - and help it develop the Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia. Iran, where India had invested considerable sums to develop a deep-water port at Chabahar to access Afghanistan while bypassing Pakistan, also said it was ready to deal with the Taliban by virtue of their common anti-Americanism (and this despite the supposed antagonism between Shiites and Sunnis in the region…). Tehran had already played middle-man between the Taliban and Kabul and has been moving closer to China while distancing itself from India since New Delhi yielded to pressure from Donald Trump and decided to adhere to American sanctions. Pakistan has been automatically strengthened by recent Afghan developments vis-à-vis India - as the latter loses in Ashraf Ghani, a partner almost as reliable as Karzai. Islamabad particularly feared that the late Afghan regime would help the Indians strengthen the Baluchi separatist guerrilla movement, especially against Chinese interests.

Moreover, an alternate coalition including China, Russia, Iran and Pakistan seems to be solidifying. Pakistan, which for decades offered a point of support to the Americans in their fight against communism and then Islamism, has probably taken a decisive step in distancing itself from the West. Prime Minister Imran Khan's reaction to the Taliban's victory are a a tell tale sign - did he not rejoice to see Afghanistan "breaking chains of slavery"? It remains to be seen whether Moscow will continue its rapprochement with Islamabad. Such a development could make South Asia a tinderbox in which two new antagonistic blocs might be most salient, and where, as a result, the ingredients of a new Cold War could gather against the backdrop of "Belt and Road Initiative vs. Indo-Pacific".

The Impact of the War Against Terror on Pakistan

. Introduction

Almost ten years after the U.S. led war on terror primarily against alQaeda and its military attacks and occupation of Afghanistan; it is time to analyze the implications for Pakistan of what American policy makers said in the aftermath of deadly terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC as America's "first war of 21st century". No war has a pleasant impact on any nation or society. While wars with weapons and military engagements cause colossal loss of human lives, the war on terror is a unique term in which the enemy primarily is a non-state actor but has a capability to strike against military and civilian targets. Terrorism is an act which is undoubtedly considered as a major threat to global peace and security but the war on terror lacks clarity, credibility and coordination as the term terrorism still has a definitional problem. A great deal has been written since September 2001, explaining the reasons who pushed former President Pervez Musharraf to join the U.S. led war on terror resulting in the dismantling of the Taliban regime in Kabul and the spill over effects of the U.S and allied military operations in Afghanistan on Pakistani society. The killing of Osama Bin Laden by the U.S. Navy Seals under "Operation Geronimo" on May 2, 2011 in a compound located in the vicinity of Pakistan Military Academy Kakul, Abbotabad and the surge in terrorist activities in Pakistan following his death also raise an important issue about the role of non-state actors in augmenting the terrorist threat in Pakistan. What is needed now is to examine important factors which have shaped Islamabad's policy in dealing with a grave and serious threat in the shape of Islamic militancy, suicide attacks and the surge of anti-Americanism particularly in provinces bordering Afghanistan. Also international and strategic dynamics are to be examined for the emergence of 'ethnic religious nationalism' in parts of Pakistan and the marginalization of secular and moderate elements in the post-September 2001 period. One major criticism in Pakistan against the U.S. led war on terror was the manner in which the former President Pervez Musharraf plunged his country in a difficult situation since September 2001. In this period drone attacks by the U.S from across the border into tribal areas caused widespread domestic resentment. Also, the Musharraf regime handed over hundreds of al-Qaeda suspects to the United States while reined in terrorist hideouts in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Washington asked Islamabad to do more to eliminate what it called the "safe heavens" of al-Qaeda and Taliban inside Pakistani territory. The warning given by the Afghan President Hamid Karzai to Pakistan on June 14, 2008 about the possibility of Afghan forces attacking what he called, "terrorist hideouts" of al-Qaeda in the tribal areas of Pakistan is another example of worsening of conflict between Kabul and Islamabad. In a quick and hard response the Pakistan government rejected the allegations of Kabul and warned the Karzai regime of serious consequences in the event of the violation of Pakistani's sovereignty. This article examines the implications of the U.S. led war on terror on Pakistan by responding to the following questions:1 . What are the implications of war on terror for Pakistan's domestic and foreign policy? 2. Why Pakistan is unable to take a firm stance on drone attacks on its territory and why ISAF-Afghan and Pakistan trilateral mechanism to prevent cross border infiltration and conflicting issues has not been able to produce positive results? 3. Is there a possibility of a qualitative change in Pakistan's role in War on Terror once the U.S. forces quit Afghanistan? The paper also examines different perceptions ranging from elite to civil society on...